Referred Articles
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 36, No.2, Summer 2008, 231-239
In this paper we offer direct evidence that financial intermediation does impact underlying asset markets. We develop a specific observable symptom of a banking system that underprices the put option imbedded in non-recourse asset-backed lending. Using a dataset for 19 countries and over 500 real estate investment trusts, we find that, following a negative demand shock, the “underpricing” economies experience far deeper asset market crashes than economies in which the put option is correctly priced.
Real Estate Economics, Vol.36, No.2, Summer, 2008, 213-239
We investigate the correlation between curb-side tree plantings and housing price movements in Philadelphia from 1998 to 2003, comparing two programs, one by the Philadelphia Horticultural Society that requires block-group effort that focuses on lowincome neighbourhoods and the other by the Fairmount Park Commission that is individual-based without specific target areas. A 7 to 11 percent price differential is identified within 4000ft of the Fairmount tree plantings. We argue that this is largely driven by either social capital creation or a signaling mechanism, on the top of an intrinsic tree value (around 2 percent). Findings using the PHS tree program suggest that development of social capital or environmentally-conscious behavior might be a less important channel. Any positive changes brought by the PHS tree plantings were not detected with sufficient statistical power.
Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 60, No. 1-2, January/February 2008, 47-66
Subprime mortgage lending has grown rapidly in recent years and with it, so have concerns about predatory lending. In response to evidence of predatory lending, most states have enacted new laws or expanded existing laws to address abuses in the subprime home loan market. The effect of these statutes is a matter of debate. This paper seeks to improve the understanding of this increasingly important issue and pays particular attention to the role that legal enforcement mechanisms play in this context. Our results are consistent with the view that anti-predatory lending laws influence subprime lending markets and that disaggregating the details of the overall legal framework into its component parts is essential for understanding subprime market dynamics. The restrictions, coverage, and enforcement components all have significant relationships with subprime market outcomes, with the coverage relationship found to be broadly consistent with the reverse lemons hypothesis put forward by Ho and Pennington-Cross (2007). The results also suggest that the newer mini-HOEPA laws have had an impact on the subprime market above and beyond the older preexisting laws, particularly for subprime originations. Broader coverage through these new laws is associated with higher origination likelihoods, while increased restrictions through the mini-HOEPA laws are associated with lower origination propensities.
Real Estate Economics, Vol. 34, No.4, Winter 2006, 479-496
Lenders are frequently accused of mispricing the put option imbedded in non-recourse lending (Herring and Wachter, 1999 and 2003). Prior research (Pavlov and Wachter, 2004) shows one lender’s incentives to underprice. Here we identify the conditions for a market-wide underpricing equilibrium. We demonstrate that in a market with many players, given sufficient time, a race to the bottom and market-wide mispricing are inevitable. Underpricing occurs because bank managers and shareholders exploit mis-priced deposit insurance. We show that the probability of the underpricing equilibrium increases with time since the previous market crash and that the more volatile the underlying asset market, the more likely it is subject to underpricing
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 19, No.4, Fall 2005, 93-114
Home mortgages have loomed continually larger in the financial situation of American households. In 1949, mortgage debt was equal to 20 percent of total household income; by 1979, it had risen to 46 percent of income; by 2001, 73 percent of income (Bernstein, Boushey and Mishel, 2003). Similarly, mortgage debt was 15 percent of household assets in 1949, but rose to 28 percent of household assets by 1979 and 41 percent of household assets by 2001. This enormous growth of American home mortgages, as shown in Figure 1 (as a percentage of GDP), has been accompanied by a transformation in their form such that American mortgages are now distinctively different from mortgages in the rest of the world. In addition, the growth in mortgage debt outstanding in the United States has closely tracked the mortgage market’s increased reliance on securitization (Cho, 2004). The structure of the modern American mortgage has evolved over time. We begin by describing this historical evolution. The U.S. mortgage before the 1930s would be nearly unrecognizable today: it featured variable interest rates, high down payments and short maturities. Before the Great Depression, homeowners typically renegotiated their loans every year. We next compare the form of U.S. home mortgages today with those in other countries. The U.S. mortgage provides many more options to borrowers than are commonly provided elsewhere: American homebuyers can choose whether to pay a fixed or floating rate of interest; they can lock in their interest rate in between the time they apply for the mortgage and the time they purchase their house; they can choose the time at which the mortgage rate resets; they can choose the term and the amortization period; they can prepay freely; and they can generally borrow against home equity freely. They can also obtain home mortgages at attractive terms with very low down payments. We discuss the nature of the U.S. government intervention in home mortgage markets that has led to the specific choices available to American homebuyers. We believe that the unique characteristics of the U.S. mortgage provide substantial benefits for American homeowners and the overall stability of the economy.
Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 1, Issue 3, April 2005
Journal of Real Estate Literature, Vol. 13, No.2, 2005
Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 15.6, November-December, 2004
This paper investigates the Asian real estate price run-up and collapse in the 1990s. We identify financial intermediaries’ underpricing of the put option imbedded in non-recourse mortgage loans as a potential cause for the observed price behavior. This underpricing is due to behavioral causes (lender optimism and disaster myopia) and/or rational response of lenders to market incentives (agency conflicts, deposit insurance, or limited liability of bank shareholders). The empirical evidence suggests that underpricing occurred in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Consequently, these countries experienced a more severe market crash than Hong Kong and Singapore, where underpricing was kept under control by strong government intervention and/or more appropriate incentive mechanisms.
Housing Policy Debate, Vol.15, Issue 3, 2005
This paper estimates, for 7 cities, a model of prime versus subprime allocation of loans in 1997 and 2002 based on both individual loan and neighborhood attributes. The paper is directly interested in the effect of neighborhood racial and ethnic composition on the likelihood of receiving a subprime loan. The paper also allows for interaction of borrower race and ethnicity with neighborhood attributes. A unique feature of the paper is that it provides additional neighborhood controls for the aggregate level of credit risk and the neighborhood level of equity risk. The paper finds some evidence for tightening loan standards over the 5-year period in the subprime market. In both years, even with risk controls, the minority share of neighborhood is consistently significant and positively related to subprime share. Furthermore, neighborhood education level is consistently significant and negatively related to subprime lending.
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2004, 393-410
We investigate the market prices of assets in fixed supply whose purchase is typically financed through non-recourse loans. The largest and most common asset in this category is real estate. We demonstrate two features of such markets: Lenders’ underpricing of the put option contained in non-recourse loans leads to inflated asset prices within efficient markets, and lenders with short-term horizons have incentives to underprice the put option. These results hold when participants in both equity and debt markets are rational. The model also allows for management compensation that is aligned with maximizing bank shareholders’ value. Using real estate transaction data we find empirical evidence consistent with the predictions of the model.
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 29, Nol.4, December 2004, 393-410
Subprime lending in the residential mortgage market, characterized by relatively high credit risk and interest rates or fees, has developed over the past decade into a prominent segment of the market (Temkin (2000)). Recent research indicates that there is geographical concentration of subprime mortgages in Census tracts where there are high concentrations of low-income and minority households. The growth in subprime lending represents an expansion in the supply of mortgage credit among households who do not meet prime market underwriting standards. Nonetheless, its apparent concentration in minority and lower income neighborhoods has generated concerns that these households may not be obtaining equal opportunity in the prime mortgage market. Such lending may undermine revitalization to the extent that it is associated with so-called predatory practices.